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THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

August 31, 1985


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PREFACE

Developments in the Horn of Africa--a region defined in this study as including Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya--concern US policy-makers and military planners for several reasons. The region's proximity to the Middle East, to the oil fields and facilities of the Persian Gulf region, and to sea-lanes used in shipping oil to the West, make it strategically important. The interests of the United States in the Horn, therefore, include maintaining good diplomatic relations with the Horn countries, gaining military access agreements, and keeping track of the activities of other foreign countries. This study describes and analyzes the complex interplay of forces affecting foreign involvement in the Horn and attempts to discern future trends and their implications for the West.

Information in this study is derived from unclassified sources.

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
Foreign Access to Military Facilities in the Horn 10

SUMMARY


The Horn of Africa is a volatile region where most governments have a tenuous hold on power because of numerous internal problems. Several also face security threats as a result of longstanding hostilities with their neighbors. To cope with these pressures and to strengthen their ability to rule, the governments seek foreign assistance. Such support is forthcoming because the Horn's strategic location is of international importance. In the past decade, the Horn has become a site for rivalry between the West and the Soviet Union. Each side views the political orientations and alignments of Horn regimes as bearing directly on the situation in surrounding areas such as the Persian Gulf.

Ethiopia is the pivotal country in the region. As the dominant nation in the Horn militarily, Ethiopia plays an important role in determining foreign policies toward the region. Ethiopia has been particularly successful in obtaining foreign military assistance to cope with its widespread internal security problems. It is now critically dependent on the Soviet Union for military aid, allowing the Soviets to influence both its foreign and domestic policies.

Since many problems causing regional instability are deep rooted and since basic foreign interests are unlikely to change significantly, the dynamics of foreign involvement probably will not change substantially during the remainder of the 1980s. It is, therefore, also probable that the current international alignments of Horn regimes will remain the same in the near to mid term.



Map - Africa



Map - Horn of Africa

1. INTRODUCTION

The dynamics of foreign involvement in the Horn of Africa are complex and fluid. The region's dramatic growth in importance to the global US-Soviet rivalry is one of the more salient factors determining the dynamics of foreign relations in the Horn. The United States and the Soviet Union have been interested in access to military facilities in the Horn to enhance their worldwide power projection capabilities since the 1960s. Furthermore, the Horn is of particular significance in the rivalry because of its proximity to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the source of much of the petroleum consumed by the West. US concern about events in the region increased with the Soviet Union's sudden heavy involvement in Ethiopia during the Somali invasion of the Ogaden in 1977 and contributed to an escalation in US-Soviet rivalry in Africa. The United States' relatively passive wait-and-see attitude regarding events in the Horn at the time of the Ogaden War changed into active efforts to gain influence following the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979--events viewed by US policymakers as increasing the vulnerability of Persian Gulf oil facilities and shipping lanes and as potentially changing the balance of power.

Historical and cultural factors play a strong role in shaping political developments in the Horn and they are at the root of many of the region's stability problems. These factors also provide the background against which foreign relations and policies are formed. They include:

- Legacies of European colonial rule, to which most of the region succumbed in the 19th century, continue to impact on national developments and foreign relations.
- The arbitrary nature of national boundaries, drawn up by the colonial powers with little regard for the ethnic distribution of populations, contributes to hostilities within and between Horn countries.
- The Horn's position at the crossroads of Arab, Islamic, and African cultures has led to clashes between these cultures in some areas and has hampered national unity.
- The nature of government rule in the Horn, which is characterized by the wide-ranging personal power of individual leaders and repression of their opponents, contributes to instability.

2. LOCAL PROBLEMS FOSTERING REGIONAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

Internal problems affecting regime stability in the countries of the Horn include fragile economies, weak political structures, regional disparities, and ethnic divisions. Although these problems contribute to individual regime fragility and thus could ultimately affect foreign relations, most internal problems in the Horn are beyond the scope of this study. Several, in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Sudan, are discussed because they foster conflict and instability beyond their borders and more directly affect foreign relations. The problems besetting Kenya and Djibouti are not likely to lead to conflict or significantly increase instability beyond their borders in the next few years.

a. Ethiopian Security Problems--Catalyst to Regional Instability

(1) Eritrea

Eritrea, on the Red Sea coast, was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941. During World War II it came under British control, and following the war, the United Nations decided to federate Eritrea with the Ethiopian empire. In November 1962 the Eritrean Assembly, under pressure from Ethiopia, including the threat of detention or worse for Assembly members, voted to incorporate Eritrea as an integral part of Ethiopia.

Eritreans who opposed integration with Ethiopia launched an armed struggle for self-determination that is still ongoing. They portray Ethiopian rule as colonialism, little different from European colonial rule. Ethiopia claims that the region was historically part of its empire, but Eritreans reject this. Eritreans opposed to Ethiopian rule have formed several groups to challenge the Ethiopian Armed Forces; the most successful currently is the Marxist-leaning Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which controls much of the Eritrean countryside. Other groups are the Eritrean Liberation Front Revolutionary Committee (ELF-REV COM), which is moderately socialist; the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC), a pro-Arab group with a Muslim membership; and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Popular Liberation Forces (ELF-PLF), an anti-Marxist group. There have been several attempts to unite the various factions, but none has succeeded. The most recent such effort, largely orchestrated by Saudi Arabia, culminated in the formation of the Eritrean Unified National Council in January 1985, but the EPLF did not participate.

Over the years, Eritrean liberation groups have succeeded in acquiring material aid, money, and training assistance from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Kuwait, and Syria. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries also supported Eritrean self-determination, but this ended when the Soviet Union became allied to the Mengistu regime in 1977. The United States does not support the Eritrean liberation movement and takes the position that Eritrea is an integral part of Ethiopia. Similarly, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) rejects Eritrean independence; its charter calls for maintenance of existing national boundaries.

The fighting in Eritrea has a direct effect on relations with Sudan since Eritrean guerrillas cross into Sudan for sanctuary and supplies. Ethiopia's handling of the Eritrean problem and the regional drought have resulted in a massive influx of refugees into Sudan, helping to drain that country's economy. While recently deposed Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiri allowed Eritrean guerrillas to operate from Sudan, the new Sudanese Government appears willing to reduce this freedom if Ethiopia ceases supporting southern Sudanese rebels. However, it is unlikely that Sudan could entirely stop infiltration of Eritreans across its border.

(2) Tigray, Gonder, and Welo

Opposition to the Mengistu regime also has taken the form of serious armed struggle in Tigray, Gonder, and Welo Provinces in northern Ethiopia. In this region, the 10-year-old Tigray People's Liberation Front

(TPLF) is fighting to bring down the Mengistu regime and to gain regional autonomy. The amount of territory controlled by the TPLF has grown steadily during the past several years and the TPLF's gains impact on the government's ability to fight the Eritrean rebels. Since the only two roads from the Ethiopian capital to Eritrea pass through Tigray, the TPLF has been able to disrupt military supply lines to Eritrea along these roads. As in the case of Eritrea, the Ethiopian Government's attempt to retain control in these provinces has resulted in refugees fleeing into Sudan and has contributed to military dependence on the Soviets.

(3) Ogaden

The Ogaden is a large, sparsely populated, and arid region of eastern Ethiopia whose residents are almost entirely ethnic Somali nomads. In the late 1800s, Emperor Menelik II claimed the area as part of his empire and it was recognized as such by the European powers. Ethiopian rule, however, never consisted of more than a few military and tax collection posts. Many Somali nomads regularly migrated back and forth from the Ogaden to the area that is today Somalia. Hostility between the Somalis and the Ethiopians, who have tried to subjugate them, has deep roots.

In the early and mid 1970s, Somalia increased its military capabilities dramatically with the help of Soviet weapons and training. During this period, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), an insurgent group of Ogaden Somalis seeking to secede from Ethiopia, waged an increasingly successful war in the Ogaden. In July 1977, Somali President Siad Barre, feeling confident of Somali military superiority and aware of Mengistu's serious internal problems, decided to invade the Ogaden. By the end of the year, Somali forces controlled most of the region. In early 1977, however, the Soviet Union initiated arms sales to Ethiopia. Later in the year, when the Somalis became aware of the arms sales, they expelled the Soviets and Cubans. The Soviets were then invited into Ethiopia and started a massive shipment of military materiel. Some 15,000 Cuban troops and Soviet and Cuban advisers were brought in to help fight against the Somalis in the Ogaden. The tide then rapidly turned against the Somali Army which, by early March 1978, was driven back into Somalia.

The Ethiopian Armed Forces, with Soviet and limited Cuban backing, are now the most powerful in the region. The Somali Army, on the other hand, is relatively weak--much of its Soviet equipment is no longer operable and Western governments have been reluctant to supply offensive weapons which could be used in another Ogaden invasion.

Somalia does not have any backing for its claims to the Ogaden in the international community which recognizes Ethiopia's present borders. This lack of foreign support is evident from Somalia's difficulties in acquiring military aid. The United States, for example, has made delivery of arms conditional on withdrawal of Somali troops fighting with the WSLF in the Ogaden. The dispute over the Ogaden fosters regional instability since it prevents peaceful coexistence between Somalis and Ethiopians.

(4) Dependence on Soviet Military Aid

Mengistu initiated ties with the Soviet Union at a time when he was beleaguered on all fronts: leftist groups were challenging his power; Eritrean rebels, with support from Arab countries, were posing a serious threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity; the United States had begun phasing out US military assistance due to human rights violations; and the WSLF, with Somali support, was stepping up its activities in the Ogaden. Mengistu, therefore, desperately needed to find outside support; and once the Soviets decided that gaining influence in Ethiopia was worth the price of losing military access in Somalia, though hesitant initially, they eventually ended Mengistu's search by giving massive support to the Ethiopian Armed Forces.

The Ethiopian regime's security problems persist. Ethiopia perceives Somalia as a threat since it has not renounced claims to the Ogaden, and it considers several other countries in the region as hostile. Sudan and Saudi Arabia are regarded with particular distrust because of their support for the Eritrean rebels and because of the regime's fear of Arab encroachment.

As a result of these serious internal and perceived external threats, Mengistu continues to rely heavily on the Soviet Union for military and security assistance. Soviet assistance enables him to repress his opposition, especially discontented ethnic groups, by force of arms. In return, the Soviets have acquired exclusive use of Ethiopia's Dahlak Islands for their Navy. To protect their heavy investment and to make their position more secure, the Soviets have pressured Mengistu into creating a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), to ensure that socialism will become institutionalized and will endure longer than a particular leader. The shift of Soviet support from Somalia to Ethiopia, thus, has had a profound impact on relations among countries of the Horn and on national developments in Ethiopia.

b. Somali Aspirations and Regional Conflict

Although many Somalis were brought together as a nation when the Somali Republic was established in July 1960 by uniting British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland, many other Somalis inhabit vast areas surrounding the Somali Republic--Djibouti, the North Eastern Province of Kenya, and the Ogaden in Ethiopia. (Somalia is unique in the Horn because, rather than containing many different ethnic groups within its borders, inhabitants are almost exclusively ethnic Somalis.) While there are numerous clans, many of which are antagonistic to each other, Somalis have a strong sense of nationalism and have a strong desire to unite all Somalis into one nation.

Somali regimes found it expedient to support Somali guerrilla groups fighting for self-determination in Kenya and Ethiopia, but this support--weapons, training, and the loan of military personnel--gained widespread international condemnation. Fighting between Somali nomads and Ethiopian military elements in the early 1960s grew into small-scale actions between Ethiopian and Somali troops. Somali Government support for, and participation in, guerrilla operations in the Ogaden continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and in 1977 Somalia launched an attack to try to seize the territory.

Somalia's irredentist claims strain the prospects for peaceful coexistence with its neighbors over the long term. Somalia's rapid armed forces buildup in the 1970s resulted in it becoming the strongest military power in the region, giving it the capability to launch an attack on Ethiopia with the expectation of winning. Pan-Somalism thus has been a destabilizing factor in the region and has affected Somalia's neighbors' perception of the need for military buildup.

c. Sudan's North-South Conflict

Differences between Sudan's northern Muslim Arab majority and the southern black non-Muslim majority populations have created serious stability problems for the government. The two cultures have been separated by the vast Sudd, a 100,000 square kilometer swampland, which forms a natural geographic barrier between the two regions and their populations. Contacts in the nineteenth century consisted of slave trading and raiding from the north, leaving a bitter legacy in the south. During the 1899-1955 Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, the south was under British rule; it remained isolated and generally neglected except for the introduction of Christianity and the use of the English language.

Insurgent activity in the south started shortly before independence in 1955 and grew during the 1960s. Southern guerrillas fighting for self-determination posed a threat to Sudanese stability and unity until February 1972, when President Nimeiri ended the civil war by a settlement that granted the south status as a semi-autonomous region. The settlement, known as the Addis Ababa Accords, provided for a separate government in the south with a regional president, recommended by a popularly elected regional assembly and appointed by the national president. The national government, with southern representation, retained responsibility in certain areas, including foreign affairs, defense, economic planning, and interregional matters. A month later the Southern Provinces Self-Government Act confirmed southern autonomy and stipulated that Islamic law and customs regarding personal matters would not be imposed on non-Muslims.

Policies and directives instituted by Nimeiri in the 1980s, however, reignited insurgency in the south. The President's June 1983 decision to divide the region into three provinces was viewed by many southerners as a move to reduce autonomy and as a breach of the Addis Ababa Accords. Furthermore, in September 1983, Nimeiri instituted Islamic law throughout the country, a step strongly opposed by southerners who practice either traditional African religions or Christianity.

Southern grievances also revolve around the economic disparities between north and south. The south believes it has not received its share of economic development funds, but suffers the consequences of poor economic management by the government and of the huge debt burden for projects that benefit the north. Two actions by Nimeiri were considered particularly blatant examples of economic policies unfair to the south. One was the decision not to build a refinery in the south for oil from a field discovered by Chevron at Bentiu, but to pipe the crude to the north for refinement and export. The other is the expensive project to construct the Jonglei Canal which will drain water from the Sudd to increase water flow into the Nile.

The canal may benefit northern Sudan and Egypt while causing widespread changes in the natural environment of the Sudd.

Sudan's close relations with Egypt also are viewed negatively in the south. Southerners are suspicious of Egyptian intentions which they perceive as further strengthening Arab culture and domination by the north. They also fear Egypt will provide military support that could help in efforts to repress the south.

The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) was created following the redivision of the south, with the aim of ousting Nimeiri and redressing north-south disparities. The SPLA also is hostile to the new Transitional Military Council which it views as little different from Nimeiri's former northern Arab-dominated government. It continues to conduct a guerrilla war that is seriously challenging government rule in the south. Security problems caused by the fighting have brought a halt to the Chevron oil exploitation project and to construction of the Jonglei Canal.

The north-south conflict has repercussions beyond Sudan's borders. Since the SPLA operates from a base in Ethiopia, there is an increased risk of cross-border military actions by Sudanese and Ethiopian Government forces. The Sudanese Government's perception that Ethiopia supports the SPLA makes Sudan less inclined to interfere with Ethiopian insurgents seeking refuge in its territory. Libya has involved itself in the conflict, until recently supporting the SPLA as a means of destabilizing the Nimeiri regime. However, Libya is anxious to gain influence with the new Sudanese regime and reportedly has ceased aiding the SPLA. In July 1985 the two countries announced an agreement under which Libya provides assistance to the Sudanese Armed Forces. Although improving relations with Libya could forestall expanded SPLA operations, if Sudan draws too close to Libya it runs the risk of damaging relations with its strongest allies--Egypt and the United States. Efforts to maintain control in the south, along with other threats to stability, led Sudan under Nimeiri to seek Egyptian military assistance, including the stationing of Egyptian troops on its territory. The instability caused by differences and inequalities between north and south is a major factor shaping Sudan's foreign relations.

d. Kenyan Security Issues

During the 1960s and 1970s, government stability and economic prosperity characterized Kenyan affairs, but the country's 4 percent population growth rate and an economic downturn in the 1980s have combined to paint a less favorable picture for the future. Kenya's economic situation is unlikely to improve sufficiently to prevent a decline in living standards for most Kenyans. The resulting discontent will lead to greater government instability. Expressions of discontent and criticism of government probably will be met with harsh measures of repression. However, Kenya's internal problems presently do not impact on neighboring countries, nor are they likely to during the next decade. Thus, it is unlikely that Kenya's internal problems will cause regional conflicts. Yet, Kenya could find itself becoming involved in a regional conflict as a result of its neighbors' internal problems. Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia are experiencing armed rebellions, and increased tensions between Kenya and one of these countries could result in

conflict if guerrilla fighters enter Kenya, especially if foreign government forces were to cross the border in pursuit of the rebels.

e. Djibouti's Vulnerability and Regional Conflict

Since its independence in 1977, Djibouti has been faced with serious stability problems, including weak government structures, an inadequate economic base, a massive influx of refugees from Ethiopia, and the threat of aggression from its neighbors. Djibouti depends on the French for its national defense and on Western and Arab countries for economic aid. It is doubtful that Djibouti could survive as a nation without such aid--if it were not for France's commitment to protect Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia might be tempted to try to annex the territory. Control of Djibouti would be attractive to Ethiopia because of Djibouti's excellent harbor that is directly linked with Addis Ababa by railroad. Ethiopian and Somali interest in Djibouti is also based on ties with Djibouti's major ethnic groups, the Afars and Issas. The greater part of the Afar ethnic group lives in Ethiopia, with 20 percent living in Djibouti. The Issas are a Somali group and in the past Somalia has included Djibouti in its call for the unification of all Somali-inhabited territory.

Djibouti's small population and size prevent it from posing a threat to other countries in the region, but these same factors combined with its strategic value make it vulnerable to foreign meddling and aggression. If France were to reduce its commitment to defend the country, it could become the site of conflict as other countries try to gain control. However, the prospects for such a scenario in the near to mid-term are dim since Djibouti has strong Western and Saudi support, and the most likely aggressors--Somalia and Ethiopia--are preoccupied with their own internal problems.

3. DYNAMICS OF RELATIONS AMONG HORN COUNTRIES

Ethiopia's position as the preeminent military power in the Horn is a dominant factor in analyzing the relationships among countries in the region. Ethiopia also plays a pivotal role because of its geographic location in the center of the region, bordering on each of the other Horn countries. Although a regional power, Ethiopia perceives itself as surrounded by hostile regimes. Historically, Ethiopia also has considered itself threatened by Islamic encroachment; Islamic rhetoric by some Arab leaders increases Ethiopia's apprehension of its Muslim neighbors.

In recent years, relations between Ethiopia and Sudan generally have been poor because of opposing ideologies and political alignments. The most significant obstacle to improved relations has been Sudan's support for Eritrean guerrillas. Mengistu is convinced that such aid and Sudan's open border policy for refugees are designed to encourage his regime's collapse. To retaliate for perceived destabilization efforts, Ethiopia has helped the SPLA. The new Sudanese Government appears to be trying to resolve its southern insurgency problem by agreeing to discontinue support of the Eritreans in exchange for a discontinuation of Ethiopian support for the SPLA.

Ethiopia's relations with Somalia are hostile due to Somalia's attempts to gain control of the Ogaden and Ethiopia's support of the Democratic Front for

the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) and the Somali National Movement (SNM) insurgent groups. In 1982 Ethiopian and DFSS troops captured two Somali border villages which they continue to occupy. Somalia appears to have taken a step to reduce tensions by ending active support to the WSLF.

Relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti are relatively good. Djibouti's port is used by Ethiopia, and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad is jointly operated. Djibouti depends heavily on revenues from Ethiopian trade through its port, and relations between the two countries are based primarily on commercial interests. Djibouti's alignment with conservative Arab countries and the West and its dependence on aid from these sources make it extremely unlikely that Djibouti will be drawn toward Ethiopia's Marxist revolutionary ideology.

Despite political differences, Ethiopia and Kenya have good relations because of their shared distrust of Somalia. Since 1964 they have had a mutual defense treaty to counter the perceived Somali threat. Relations between Ethiopia and Kenya were enhanced by the personal friendship of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, and Ethiopia's emperor, Haile Selassie. Although Ethiopia's political orientation has changed radically since the emperor was removed in 1974, mutual security concerns regarding Somalia have fostered continued dialog between them. In January 1979 Ethiopia and Kenya signed a 10-year treaty of friendship and cooperation.

Somalia's relations with Kenya appear to be improving and high-level officials of the two countries have exchanged visits recently. President Siad Barre stated in 1981 that Somalia had no claims to Kenyan territory and in December 1983 he attended Kenya's 20th anniversary of independence celebrations. The United States, as a friend of both, has been instrumental in reducing tensions between them.

Although Somalia claimed Djibouti as part of "Greater Somalia" prior to Djibouti's independence, it now appears to have softened its claim. To reduce its isolation in the region, Somalia tries to maintain friendly relations with Djibouti; Djibouti is officially neutral in the hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia while privately leaning toward Ethiopia for the sake of trade and commerce.

Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya are wary of Ethiopia's close relations with the Soviet Union and the rapid expansion of its military as a result of Soviet aid. Soviet assistance has allowed the Mengistu regime to seek a military solution to its problems, especially in Eritrea, and has created a refugee problem for Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, increasing tension in the Horn.

4. DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN

As the influence of former colonial powers weakened in the five nations of the Horn following independence, competition between the United States and the Soviet Union characterized foreign involvement in the region. Several Arab countries, desiring to assert their leadership in the Arab and Islamic world, also became involved in Horn events. The region's chronic conflicts provide outsiders opportunities for influence in this strategically important region

through provision of arms and economic assistance. These conflicts, however, also hamper the ability of foreign powers to pursue their goals.

The regimes in the Horn take advantage of the region's strategic importance by offering military access rights to countries that will provide large-scale military and economic aid. They are faced with such severe stability problems that foreign involvement is sought as a means of strengthening their fragile hold on power. Each Horn government has found the access-for-aid formula to be advantageous, and each permits some form of military access to at least one foreign country. The scale of the exchange has been particularly large in the case of Soviet involvement in Ethiopia. (See table, p.10.)

a. Communist Countries

(1) The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's fundamental reason for involvement in the Horn is the region's strategic location. Both it and the United States are determined not to let the other gain a significant advantage. Each accuses the other of using the Horn as a component of a plan for global domination. The Horn is particularly important because of the areas adjacent to it. Facilities in the Horn have been used by the USSR and the United States for communication and surveillance. The Soviets have considerable interest in maintaining free passage through the important Suez Canal/Red Sea/Bab el Mandeb waterway because it substantially shortens sea links between the European and Asian regions of the Soviet Union. The West likewise is interested in this conduit for international trade. Closure would mean that all sea traffic would have to be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of the African continent.

The Soviet military is interested in obtaining access privileges to facilities for its naval and air forces in order to extend their scope of military operations, which include surveillance activities, showing a presence in the Indian Ocean, and keeping up with the expansion of the US naval fleet. The establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force in March 1980, followed by the creation of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) in January 1983, with responsibility for an area stretching from the Horn of Africa to Pakistan, was viewed as improving US capabilities to deploy troops to the region, thus potentially altering the balance of power in the area to favor the United States. Retaining a strategic foothold in Ethiopia, therefore, has become all the more imperative for the Soviets.

The Horn also is of strategic interest because of its proximity to the Middle East, an area that could, in turn, figure in the southern theater in the event of a war in Europe. In addition, the southern part of the Soviet Union borders on the Middle East. Soviet and US military planners, therefore, feel that domination of the Horn by the other side would affect the military balance in adjacent areas.

The Soviet Union attempts to develop friendly relations with governments in the region to influence their foreign policies. It has provided an enormous amount of aid (most sources estimate more than three billion dollars in military assistance), with virtually no prospect of

FOREIGN ACCESS TO MILITARY FACILITIES IN THE HORN

	SUDAN	ETHIOPIA	DJIBOUTI	SOMALIA	KENYA
SOVIET UNION		Soviet military has exclusive use of the Dahlak Islands. Facilities there are primary source of logistics and maintenance support for Soviet Indian Ocean squadron. USSR is allowed access to other ports and airfields.			
EGYPT		Under a 1976 joint defense pact Egypt agrees to help defend Sudan if it is attacked. Status of the pact under the new regime is unclear.			
FRANCE			France is responsible for Djibouti's national defense. Over 4,000 French troops are based in the country. Djibouti is the key base for France's Indian Ocean squadron.		
UNITED KINGDOM				Agreement permits British military training exercises in Kenya.	
UNITED STATES		An agreement allowing the United States to station troops in Sudan, signed by former President Nimeiri, still appears to be valid under Sudan's new government.	Access arrangement allows US Navy to make port calls, use bunkering facilities, and airport at Djibouti.	Agreement allows limited US access to naval facilities.	Agreement permits limited access to naval and air facilities, including Navy port calls, maintenance work, and crew shore leave at Mombasa. US Armed Forces allowed to operate from Kenya in the event of an emergency in the Persian Gulf region.

recovering it anytime soon, to gain and maintain its ties with the Ethiopian regime.

The Soviets realize that supplying arms to Ethiopia may not guarantee a lasting relationship should Mengistu leave the scene; therefore, they are attempting to broaden involvement by helping to create a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party and Soviet-style government structures. Strengthening government structures through the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), which was established on 10 September 1984, serves a three-fold purpose. First, it is designed to broaden the government's power base beyond the Armed Forces. Second, creating party structures and cadres interested in preserving and expanding party influence will provide continuity in government should Mengistu be removed from the scene. Third, the USSR is using its involvement in Ethiopia and the WPE to test a theory evolved in the 1970s concerning revolutionary change and building socialism in the Third World.

According to this theory, Third World countries, given propitious circumstances, can follow a path toward socialism by establishing a vanguard party and do not need to go through a capitalist phase. A vanguard party, composed of selected, ideologically trained cadres, can achieve this goal with support from the Soviet Union and its allies. The Soviet Union is attempting to put its Third World political theory into practice in Ethiopia where most of its efforts and resources in sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated. Through patience, determination, and pressure, the USSR succeeded in persuading Mengistu to accept a vanguard party. Mengistu had resisted for a long time, no doubt fearing that a party could eventually challenge his power.

Although the leadership of the WPE closely parallels that of the government and includes a heavy military representation, the party differs from the government in that members are expected to be committed to Marxism-Leninism. Since 1983 thousands of Ethiopians, now party members, have received intensive ideological training from Soviet and East European instructors and many were sent to the Soviet Union for this training. By September 1984 the party network reached all regions of the country and affected many aspects of Ethiopian life, but how committed and influential party members are remains unclear. Through the establishment of the WPE, the Soviets hope to solidify their relationship with Ethiopia, making it less prone to sudden termination or drastic reduction should relations with the regime sour--as happened in Sudan (1971) and Somalia (1977).

While the Soviets concentrate their involvement in Ethiopia, they maintain relations with governments and potential leaders in other Horn countries. The Soviets attempt to make friends among government opponents in the Horn countries that are currently pro-Western. Although this effort is low-key, consisting of establishing social contacts and arranging exchanges of visits, it is steady. This tactic is low-risk and puts the Soviets in a good position to take advantage of any opportunities that might arise, such as the overthrow of Nimeiri in Sudan.

(2) Other Communist Countries

The involvement of East European countries in the Horn has three main purposes: to promote socialism, to support Soviet goals, and to take

advantage of commercial opportunities. The Horn countries perceive East European countries as sources of economic and military assistance. The policy of support for Soviet goals is evident in Ethiopia where the East Europeans have been particularly active in helping to build the WPE. Furthermore, they are assisting in the resettlement of drought victims in the north to areas in western and southern Ethiopia, they are involved in economic development projects in Ethiopia, and they have trade ties with the other Horn nations. The East Germans have been involved in organizing and training Ethiopia's internal security services.

Cuba's policies in the Horn are distinct from the Soviet Union's since it has not followed the Soviet lead in helping Ethiopia fight Eritrean insurgents. Although Cuba deployed about 15,000 troops to fight in the Ogaden beginning in 1977, it has refrained from becoming similarly involved in Eritrea. Cuba's explanation is that in the Ogaden conflict it was helping Ethiopia fight a foreign aggressor, but the Eritrean conflict is an internal problem. Today there are several thousand Cuban troops in Ethiopia.

Chinese and North Korean involvement in the Horn consists primarily of small-scale, but visible, development assistance projects. Their activities include building infrastructure, setting up agriculture schemes, and providing medical teams. The aid of these two countries is appreciated and could enhance their ability to become more deeply involved in the Horn should they wish to in the future.

b. Middle Eastern Countries

(1) Libya

Libyan involvement in the Horn of Africa reflects general Libyan foreign policy as shaped by Chief of State Muammar Qadhafi's personal ambitions and his desire to avoid isolation by maintaining ties with countries in the region. He is anxious to be regarded as a leader of the Arab world, of Muslim Africa, and of North Africa. He also wants to exercise influence in shaping the foreign policies of other nations to reflect his own radical politics. High among Qadhafi's priorities is subverting US influence in the region. In the Horn, he has tried to destabilize conservative, pro-US governments and has been particularly hostile to Somali President Siad Barre and former Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiri. His tactics include supporting dissident elements in Somalia and Sudan and attempting to draw governments away from the influence of the United States and its conservative Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Through its oil wealth, Libya can offer financial inducements to get cooperation.

Somali-Libyan relations have been poor since the signing of a military access agreement by Somalia and the United States in 1980. In 1981 Qadhafi promised to give the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) \$600 million to help overthrow the Siad Barre regime. At that time, the DFSS was causing significant security problems for the Somali Government. The DFSS increased its anti-US rhetoric, probably in part to please its new patron, and pledged to abrogate the treaty with the United States if it gained power.

By April 1985, however, Qadhafi appeared to be shifting his tactics in Somalia. Libya and Somalia announced they were reestablishing diplomatic relations in the interests of "Arab unity." Libya's change of tactics may, in part, have been a result of its perception that Siad Barre was dissatisfied with the amount of US military aid. The DFSS's decline is another reason the Libyans may have decided to deal with Siad Barre; it has suffered leadership quarrels and does not have the ability to bring down the Somali Government. Reestablishing diplomatic relations with Somalia does not preclude continued Libyan support for dissident elements--it may make such support easier. A presence in Somalia can be viewed as a victory for Qadhafi in his rivalry with conservative Arab countries for influence and in his attempts to undermine US foreign policy goals. From the Somali Government perspective, better relations with Libya could motivate the United States, West European countries, and Saudi Arabia to be more generous in granting requests for aid, particularly military aid, and could provide opportunities to persuade Qadhafi to stop supporting the DFSS.

Libyan relations with Sudan have been strained for the past decade. On numerous occasions, Nimeiri accused Libya of encouraging subversion against his government, and in July 1976 there was a Libyan-backed coup attempt. Libya has supported Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) guerrillas who are seriously disrupting Sudanese Government rule in the south. This support was perceived as significant by Nimeiri. In addition, Libyan activities in Chad have caused thousands of Chadian refugees to flee to Sudan, increasing the burden on Sudan's already strained economy. Libya thus poses a security threat from Sudan's eastern border through the Ethiopian-based SPLA, and from the west through Qadhafi's territorial ambitions in Chad.

Sudan was a Libyan target also because of former President Nimeiri's good relations with the United States and conservative Arab countries and because of Sudan's support for Egypt following the Camp David Accords. Sudan retaliated by giving sanctuary to Qadhafi's opponents, beaming hostile radio broadcasts into Libya, and strengthening military relations with Egypt and the United States.

Shortly after seizing power from Nimeiri on 6 April 1985, Sudan's Transitional Military Council stated that it wanted to improve relations with Libya, and on 23 April an agreement was signed to normalize relations. Members of the anti-Qadhafi National Salvation Front reportedly have left Sudan at the new government's insistence. Libya, in turn, reportedly has cut off aid to the SPLA, and under a defense pact signed in July 1985, Libya is to provide military aid to Sudan. However, the new Sudanese regime may have overestimated the SPLA's dependence on Libya. The SPLA is likely to survive without Libyan aid, especially if Ethiopia continues to tolerate the presence of Sudanese rebels in its territory. Sudan's honeymoon with Qadhafi, therefore, may be short-lived. There is no evidence that Libya has delivered significant quantities of military materiel since the July pact. Sudan's moves to improve relations with Libya do not signify a drift toward radical politics or a desire to cut relations with the United States and its traditional conservative allies. Instead, the new regime appears to be trying to lessen the threat from Libya through conciliation. Sudanese officials also have explained that they cannot afford to reject aid from any source. Unless

Libya provides substantial aid to Sudan, it is unlikely the recent warming of relations will be sustained.

Kenya is not part of the geographic area where Qadhafi's main ambitions lie and does not present a favorable environment for carrying out his goals. The Kenyan Government is pro-Western and Qadhafi's calls for pan-Arabism and Islamic unity have no appeal since Kenyans are not Arabs and very few are Muslim.

At present, there is little interaction between Djibouti and Libya. Djibouti's ties to France, Saudi Arabia, and the United States undoubtedly annoy Qadhafi, making the country vulnerable to Libyan meddling. Libya has on occasion given Djibouti military equipment--20 armored personnel carriers in 1980 and two patrol boats prior to that. These gifts were probably an attempt to open prospects for future Libyan influence should the French reduce their involvement.

Libyan relations with Ethiopia are relatively good and have been so for a decade. Libya's friendship with Ethiopia is part of its strategy against the West and conservative Arab countries. Relations are based on a common hostility toward the United States, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and until recently on a mutual desire to destabilize the Sudanese and Somali regimes. In 1981 Libya, Ethiopia, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen signed a tripartite treaty which Qadhafi described as a defense pact. However, nothing substantive appears to have resulted from the treaty. The Ethiopians do not entirely trust Libyan intentions, and Libya's improved relations with Sudan and Somalia since April 1985 have increased Ethiopia's wariness of Libya.

(2) Egypt

Egypt plays an active role in the Horn and its relations with Sudan have been particularly close. Nimeiri pursued a policy of national integration with Egypt, finding it convenient to have a powerful protector. The similar political orientations of Nimeiri and Egyptian leaders also facilitated relations. Under a defense treaty signed in 1976, Egypt defends Sudan against external attack as well as internal rebellion. Egypt has had a military presence in Sudan most of the time since the signing of the treaty. As a sign of support, Egypt sent several thousand troops to Sudan following an air raid on Omdurman in March 1984, allegedly by a Libyan aircraft. Relations have become strained since the April 1985 coup in Sudan. Although the new leaders have said they wish to continue close ties with Egypt, their improved relations with Libya are not to Cairo's liking. Sudan's request to have Nimeiri extradited from Egypt also is a source of tension.

Economic integration has been advocated by leaders of both countries, since their economies could complement each other. Egypt has a fairly well-developed industrial base and Sudan is considered to have enormous agricultural potential. In addition, because Egypt is dependent on the water of the Nile River that flows through Sudan, it wants to ensure that it is not diverted before reaching Egypt. The joint Egyptian-Sudanese project to build the Jonglei Canal has stopped because of fighting between SPLA guerrillas and

Sudanese Government forces. Egypt, therefore, views Sudan's internal security problems as directly affecting its own interests and security.

Not all Sudanese advocate close cooperation with Egypt. Southerners oppose it because they fear it would work against southern autonomy and lead to even stronger domination by Arab culture and Islam. The Sudanese Mahdist movement also voices strong anti-Egyptian sentiments, and the attitudes of several other political factions tend to be ambiguous. Many northerners, including those in the Armed Forces, consider close cooperation with Egypt humiliating since it shows Sudan's inability to maintain its own security.

Egypt's policy toward Somalia is based primarily on a desire to keep Soviet influence out of the area and on Somalia's support following the Camp David Accords. The Somali regime, being fairly isolated in Africa because of its pan-Somali aspirations, welcomes Egyptian friendship. Egypt recently agreed to a large purchase of Somali cattle which will improve Somalia's foreign exchange situation. The Somalis also seek Egyptian military assistance.

The Egyptian and Ethiopian Governments have managed to maintain fairly good relations, despite their very different political orientations and superpower alignments. Egypt tries to maintain friendly relations with Ethiopia to undercut Soviet and Libyan influence in the Red Sea region and reduce the threat to Sudan. The Egyptians also want to be on good terms with Ethiopia because the headwaters of the Blue Nile are in Ethiopia. The Egyptian Government recently demonstrated its friendly disposition by publicly confirming its commitment to Ethiopia's territorial integrity.

(3) Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is interested in the affairs of nations surrounding the Red Sea because use of the Red Sea is vital to its oil exports. Another major Saudi concern is expanding Soviet influence. The Soviet presence and strong influence in Ethiopia and the invasion of Afghanistan have intensified Saudi anxieties. Saudi leaders believe that their country is the ultimate target of Soviet expansionism because it has the world's highest proven oil reserves which are vital to the West. The Saudis also are concerned about Libyan influence in the region, particularly in Sudan.

With the exception of Djibouti, all the countries that face Saudi Arabia across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have been in the Soviet camp. Only Ethiopia is now pro-Soviet; but, in the Saudi view, instability in Sudan and Somalia make them vulnerable to Soviet penetration. Saudi Arabia tries to gain influence by aiding Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia financially; here Saudi goals and methods parallel those of the United States.

Saudi Arabia backs the Eritrean struggle against the Ethiopian Government because it would like to see a friendly Islamic country bordering the Red Sea and to diminish Soviet access to facilities there. The Eritrean groups it supports, however, do not have significant military capabilities. The militarily active EPLF is considered too radical and leftist to gain Saudi

support. Saudi Arabia is trying to unite the Eritrean factions to improve the likelihood of their success.

Situated in a highly strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Djibouti receives generous aid from Saudi Arabia. Djibouti's economy and probably its existence as a nation depend on foreign assistance. France has been its principal source of support, and although French expenditures and personnel have been reduced in recent years, a further cut in the near to medium term is not anticipated. However, in the unlikely event that France substantially reduces its commitment to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia could be required to increase its largesse to help sustain a friendly regime.

(4) Syria and Iraq

Syria and Iraq are involved in the Horn through their support of the Eritrean struggle against Ethiopian rule. This policy conflicts with that of Libya and the Soviet Union but is in harmony with conservative Arab states' policies. Both countries have supported the Eritreans since the 1960s because they consider Eritrea part of the Arab and Muslim world. Syria has provided weapons and training to Eritreans, despite the fact that it depends on the Soviet Union for arms and the Soviet Union is involved on the Ethiopian side in the Eritrean conflict. By continuing its support for the Eritreans, Syria demonstrates that its foreign policy is not dictated by the Soviets. Syria agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in 1980, but its support of the Eritreans is firm. Iraqi support has diminished since the start of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 which has diverted most of its resources.

(5) The Yemens

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) lie at the strategic Bab el Mandeb Straight, potential choke point for closing the Red Sea, and just 30 kilometers from Djibouti. These two countries, therefore, play a role in the East-West competition to gain influence and military access rights in the region. The PDRY has become the USSR's closest Arab ally and adopts doctrinaire Communist policies in its foreign relations. The Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans have military personnel there and have established extensive military facilities, including communications facilities, missile sites, and nuclear submarine pens. They also have delivered modern tanks and aircraft. The PDRY has been involved in Ethiopian affairs on a number of occasions over the years. Prior to the Ethiopian revolution the PDRY supported Eritrean insurgents. During the 1977-78 Ogaden War the PDRY sent military personnel to help the Ethiopians in that war and in fighting against the Eritrean insurgents. The strong Soviet presence on one side of the Bab el Mandeb Straight in the PDRY heightens Western interest in retaining access to military facilities in Djibouti.

The YAR attempts to maintain a nonaligned foreign policy. In the past Saudi Arabia exerted strong influence on the country's affairs. In recent years, though, the YAR has managed to attract foreign aid from a variety of countries, including military aid from the Soviet Union. The YAR opposes foreign military bases in the region.

(6) Israel

The Arab-Israeli conflict affects political alignments in the Horn. The countries with strong Arab ties--Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia--do not recognize Israel. Kenya, under Arab pressure, also broke diplomatic relations with Israel following the outbreak of the October 1973 war. However, Kenya's expectations of gaining significant oil price concessions and economic assistance from the Arab oil exporting countries in return for severing relations with Israel were disappointed when Kenya's economy was severely affected by the oil price increases later in the 1970s. Kenya maintains trade and unofficial diplomatic relations with Israel and there is a strong Israeli commercial presence in the country.

Israel and Ethiopia have unofficial relations. Israel had close ties with pre-revolutionary Ethiopia as both countries wanted to prevent the Red Sea from becoming an "Arab Lake." Although this issue concerns Israel less now because relations with Egypt have improved, Israel is still interested in good relations with Ethiopia since the two have common Arab enemies. Israel reportedly delivered approximately \$20 million worth of weapons to Ethiopia in 1983. If true, this Israeli policy goes against US interests. During the airlift of Ethiopian Jews from Sudan to Israel in late 1984 and early 1985, there were allegations that Mengistu was permitting the evacuation in return for Israeli arms and money.

c. Western Countries

(1) France

France's main interest in the Horn concerns Djibouti, a former colony. When France granted independence to Djibouti in 1977 the two countries signed agreements for French development and security assistance. At present more than 4,000 French troops are stationed in the country and are an effective deterrent to any moves by either Somalia or Ethiopia to try to seize control of the country. Djibouti, in turn, provides France a base for its Indian Ocean naval fleet. In recent years, however, France has reduced its presence in Djibouti, and Djibouti has begun to look for alternative sources of aid.

France does not have particularly strong interests in other Horn countries. It likes to maintain friendly relations with as many countries as possible to promote French business interests. A notable success in this respect is the contract won by a French company to construct the Jonglei Canal in Sudan.

(2) Other West European Countries

Europe is highly dependent on Arab oil and, therefore, has an interest in the stability of the Horn. Italy, as a former regional colonial power, has a special interest in Horn affairs. Italian cultural influence remains evident in Eritrea and thousands of Eritrean refugees live in Italy. It attempts to maintain good relations with both Ethiopia and Somalia and to ease tensions between the two countries. Somalia is interested in obtaining military assistance and weapons from Italy, but the latter has been reluctant

to provide arms that cannot be paid for. Like the United States, Italy probably fears that arming Somalia could increase tensions in the Horn.

The United Kingdom, as the former colonial ruler of Kenya and northern Somalia, also retains an interest in the region. Commercial ties between Britain and Kenya are strong, and Britain has an agreement with Kenya to conduct military training. Although there is still strong British cultural influence in Kenya, the United States has supplanted Britain as Kenya's strongest Western ally.

The interests of other West European countries are primarily economic and keenest in Kenya--the most prosperous country in the region. The amount of US development aid flowing into Sudan also has increased opportunities for European businessmen and technicians.

(3) United States

US relations with Horn countries are largely determined by interests in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. The political alignments of countries in the region also affect US policies, and Ethiopia's alliance with the USSR plays a central role in US policymaking pertaining to the region. American policies in the Horn also reflect general policies toward sub-Saharan Africa, such as promoting economic reforms.

The Horn has gained importance in American military planning since the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The overriding US concern is to protect oil fields and shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf region to ensure the uninterrupted flow of oil to the West. The vulnerability of Gulf oil supplies was perceived as increasing when Soviet forces advanced to within 500 kilometers of the Persian Gulf by occupying Afghanistan. The USCENTCOM was created specifically to improve US military power projection capabilities in Southwest Asia. Further, the United States has acquired access rights to port and air facilities in the Horn for military contingency planning. All the countries in the Horn, except Ethiopia, have access agreements with the United States. (See table, p.10).

The Ethiopian regime's close ties to the Soviet Union work against the US aim of limiting the Soviet presence in the region. Some US observers fear that the Soviets could use Ethiopia as a staging area for intervention elsewhere in Africa. In addition, the presence of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops help keep the vehemently anti-American Mengistu in power. Moreover, Ethiopia supports rebel groups that are trying to bring down neighboring governments friendly to the United States and has allowed Libya to do the same from its territory.

While the United States perceives the Mengistu regime as a destabilizing force in the Horn, the Ethiopians view themselves as threatened by US actions in the region. Ethiopia regarded US support of Nimeiri as a conscious US attempt to bring down Mengistu since Nimeiri supported the Eritrean rebels. The famine assistance the United States has sent during the current drought produced only mixed reactions from Ethiopian officials. Mengistu charges that the United States has used food aid as a tool to destabilize the government, first by delaying the aid and then by restricting

its use. While some officials acknowledge in private that US aid has been generous, especially compared to the Soviet Union's, the official press largely ignores the US relief effort.

US relations with other Horn countries are friendly and ties with Sudan have been particularly strong in recent years. American policy toward Sudan is closely linked to US policies toward Egypt, Libya, and the USSR. The United States wants to remain close with Egypt and recognizes that Sudan's stability affects Egypt. Sudan's geographical location bordering Chad, Libya, and Ethiopia positions it to be a bulwark against the spread of Libyan and Soviet influence. US-Sudanese ties may change since Sudan's new government has given conflicting signals about its desire to continue relations as before and since the desire for continued good relations is not unanimous in Sudan. Although Sudan appreciates US military and economic aid, the new regime will probably try to move in a more nonaligned direction and disassociate itself from some of Nimeiri's policies. The United States also is concerned with Sudan's growing ties with Libya.

The primary US interest in Somalia is access to military facilities, and in 1980 the two countries signed an agreement under which the United States gained access to the ports of Berbera and Mogadishu and to Somali airfields in exchange for US military equipment. The Somalis have been disappointed in the amount and type of military equipment they have acquired; however, the United States also gives vitally needed economic assistance.

Kenya is one of the United States' closest allies in sub-Saharan Africa. As one of Africa's most stable and more prosperous countries, it has been able to attract US and other foreign corporations. Its pro-Western government encourages private enterprise and foreign investment. Since 1980, the United States has had a military access agreement with Kenya allowing use of Kenyan port and air facilities if the United States needs to move forces into the Persian Gulf. Kenya also allows the US Navy to make port calls at Mombasa where sailors from the Indian Ocean fleet take shore leave.

One sticking point in US-Kenyan relations has been US military assistance to Somalia. The United States has had to take Kenyan anxiety about Somali irredentism into consideration in decisions regarding aid to Somalia. Somali-Kenyan hostility concerns the United States because it has interests in both countries and does not want to lose either as an ally.

The United States values its relationship with Kenya because it has been such a reliable ally. The future stability of President Daniel Arap Moi's regime cannot be taken for granted, however, as there is simmering discontent and Moi has reacted harshly to criticism and signs of opposition. His rule increasingly has become autocratic, alienating many Kenyans. US aid to Kenya helps to ease economic problems, reducing some domestic pressures on Moi's government.

Djibouti is on good terms with the United States, which benefits from France's involvement in the country, ensuring that Djibouti will retain a pro-Western stance. Friendly relations with Djibouti are an asset to the US Armed Forces--the Navy is allowed to make port calls and US aircraft use the

Djibouti airport. The United States would welcome greater Saudi economic aid to Djibouti, especially if the French were to reduce their presence.

5. OUTLOOK: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE AND FUTURE TRENDS

The future of the Horn is complicated by the instability of the Horn regimes and complex intra-regional and external relations. There are general trends that likely will continue for the next 2 to 5 years. The internal problems contributing to regime instability will not be solved in this period. Famine is expected to persist for years, even if the drought ends. To cope with their problems, regimes in the Horn will continue to try to obtain assistance from the outside. In addition, the basic interests of foreign countries in the Horn region are unlikely to change significantly.

The Soviets will work to solidify their influence in Ethiopia, especially in the WPE. Soviet successes in Ethiopia have been achieved at high financial cost and they will therefore try to protect their investment. While it is unlikely that other Horn countries will become aligned with the USSR in the near term, the Soviets will try to improve relations with them, and may make some minor gains. For instance, the new Sudanese Government will probably be less hostile to the Soviets than Nimeiri and will try to maintain a more nonaligned stance. Siad Barre recently stated that he was willing to normalize relations with the USSR, so the size of the Soviet diplomatic corps in Somalia may grow.

The objectives of Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Israel are also likely to remain fairly constant during the next few years. Because of the decline in Libya's oil revenues, Qadhafi will not have as much money at his disposal for buying influence as he did in the 1970s, but his goals will remain the same. Iraq might regain some influence if it can extricate itself from the war with Iran.

The Socialist Government of French President Mitterrand began reducing the French presence in Djibouti when it first came to power in 1981, but this trend appears to have ended and it is unlikely that France will further reduce its commitment. If the French Socialists lose in the 1987 elections and a conservative government comes to power, a reduction in the French presence in Djibouti will be even less likely. However, if the French do substantially lessen their commitment, Djibouti would probably try to pressure the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt to increase their support.

The United States will continue to try to foster regime stability of friendly nations through economic and military aid. Protecting the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf will remain a strong US interest; therefore, retaining access to military facilities and undertaking military training exercises in the Horn will continue to be major US objectives.

The greatest prospect for change stems from Nimeiri's removal from power in Sudan. A new leadership in Sudan offers the possibility for improved relations between Ethiopia and Sudan, although the flow of refugees to Sudan may continue tensions if Ethiopia fails to overcome its famine. The lack of strong central leadership also will be a problem for the new regime. If it

founders, a coup by leftists could occur and result in significant changes in Sudan's foreign relations.

Since there is widespread discontent with Somali President Siad Barre's leadership, his position is precarious and his removal from office during the next 5 years is a possibility, though he has shown remarkable skill in neutralizing his opponents by alternately using repression and diplomacy. The political leanings of those who might succeed in overthrowing Siad Barre run the gamut and include those espousing narrow clan interests, conservative northern businessmen, military officers, and Ethiopian-backed DFSS insurgents who voice strong criticism of the United States. Should the DFSS gain control of the country, which does not appear likely in the next few years since its strength appears to be declining, relations with the United States would suffer and DFSS leaders would likely seek and receive support from the Soviet Union. Any group seizing power would have difficulty establishing a wide popular consensus and the country would continue to face serious stability problems.

Kenya and Djibouti will probably seek to maintain good relations with the United States and Western countries in the near to mid term. Mounting pressures on the governments of these Horn countries from internal problems could alter some aspects of their foreign relations. For example, they might try to strengthen relations, including wider security cooperation, in order to maintain domestic control. Alternatively, a coup in either country could bring a less friendly regime to power and lead to a reduction in military cooperation with the West.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST

The trends in the Horn have several implications for the future of foreign involvement in the region. In Ethiopia, internal problems are unlikely to be resolved by the present leadership in the next few years. Ethiopia's geographic position and status as a regional power mean that Ethiopia will continue to play a role in its neighbors' security. Mengistu will need Soviet arms and security assistance to stay in power and maintain the integrity of Ethiopian territory. Although the Soviet Union is not able to make significant contributions to Ethiopia's development, it can provide as much military equipment as the Ethiopian Armed Forces can absorb. Mengistu will continue to be unpopular, but attempts to oust him are not likely to succeed.

The Soviet presence in Ethiopia will condition the involvement of other external powers with each of the Horn countries. The United States and Saudi Arabia, major financial aid contributors to the region, will try to dissuade other Horn nations from drawing closer to the Soviets. Although the Soviet presence hampers US goals in the region, Ethiopia will not become a Socialist development success story during the next few years. Soviet actions in Ethiopia, therefore, are unlikely to lead to wider Soviet influence elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa or to diminish US influence there.

Although Somali President Siad Barre seems willing to turn in any direction to find military aid, it is unlikely that the USSR will become a major arms supplier to Somalia. Soviet interests in Ethiopia preclude it from providing military assistance that could be used against Ethiopia. In

addition, if Somalia established close relations with the USSR, Western countries and Saudi Arabia would likely cut off their economic aid, which Siad Barre depends on to stay in power.

The Horn's continuing travails will have an effect on all foreign involvement in the Horn. The region's underdevelopment and its ethnically based conflicts are long-term problems that will not be resolved through changes in leadership or in foreign backing. In the current situation, where Ethiopia is aligned with the USSR and the other countries with the West, instability promotes Soviet interests. (Sudan's leaders are reviewing the country's past foreign alliances, but there are no indications of a turn toward the Soviets.) The fighting in northern Ethiopia has facilitated the Soviets' ability to gain a foothold in Ethiopia since the government has become dependent on Soviet military assistance to fight the rebels. In other countries, where the Soviets have not been able to gain an entree, instability does not harm Soviet goals but does make policy planning more difficult for the United States.

The United States' ability and willingness to provide economic and military assistance to its friends in Africa will be an asset to maintaining good relations with regimes in the Horn. Because the governments in the Horn are fairly insecure, it is conceivable that a group hostile to the United States could come to power in one of the countries. Although such an event would hurt US prestige, it would not severely affect the US position in the region since US assets are not overly concentrated in any one country.

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